Introduction
How many people actively enjoy history classes? I can only think of a few people who would fall under that category. I cannot blame people for finding history class boring at times, and I agree that the classes can require a disproportionately large amount of homework time. However, I still think that the interesting units make the classes worth it. Even if the content is not the most entertaining, people (hopefully) respect the writing and analytical skills that history teaches. From reading the news to getting into politics, you can find a use for these skills. To further this point, we will embark on a case study based on the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine that began in February this year was a dramatic escalation of the conflict between the two nations. The war has resulted in many humiliations and failures by the Russian forces, which have been closely watched by the world and have inspired many memes. While the current course of the war has certainly been surprising, many of its aspects closely parallel historical conflicts. It is easy to make all sorts of comparisons to previous wars Russia has been involved in; the Polish-Soviet War, Winter War, and the Soviet-Afghan War are likely some of the first wars that come to your mind. While there is much content to write about in analyzing these wars, this article will instead focus on the two Chechen Wars fought by the Russian Federation in the 1990s. By analyzing the military and political events that occurred during the Chechen Wars, we can acquire a better understanding of the present developments in Ukraine and gain knowledge to more accurately speculate on the future of the conflict—which is always something great to bring up at Christmas dinner with the family, or at any dinner, truthfully.
The First Chechen War
On December 31, 1991, the Soviet Union formally dissolved. Chechnya, a primarily Muslim soviet republic in the Caucasus region, had already declared independence in August of 1991. In December 1994, Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, authorized military action to “restore constitutional order” in Chechnya.
Most of the political leadership, including Boris Yeltsin, believed the invasion would be quick and easy. However, some high-ranking army leadership resigned in protest due to moral concerns or the belief that Russia would not win the invasion easily.
To make a long story short, the invasion was not quick and easy. While the armies initially made good ground in the north, they were completely stopped when they tried to take the capital city of Grozny. One important military lesson that anyone should know is that attacking an urban position is generally extremely painful. Another important military lesson is that defending an urban position is equally painful but several times more effective.
Here are a few principles recommended by the US Army to effectively seize an urban objective:
- Use reconnaissance to understand enemy composition, city layout, and other important information.
- Isolate the city to make sure the enemy cannot be reinforced.
- Ensure all units are working together to cover their weaknesses and amplify their total combat power.
These principles are not new. The Red Army learned these tactics during the Second World War, using them to great effect during their offensives in 1944-1945. However, they appeared to forget these tactics during the Cold War. Their tactical failures were also amplified by the breakdown of other combat functions, such as logistics and training.
Despite heavy losses, the Russians proved their ability to learn by re-adopting their WW2 tactics, eventually taking the city in March of 1995, at the mere cost of roughly 1800 soldiers killed and 4670 wounded. What is more telling, however, is the estimated civilian death toll of at least 27,000, or over 7,000 more than the population of Morristown; these deaths resulted from direct fighting as well as airstrikes and artillery bombardment. After seizing the city, Russian forces moved to push into the south of Chechnya, leaving behind a reduced security force.
Chechen forces retook Grozny in a counteroffensive in August 1996, inflicting heavy casualties on the Russian units that tried to counterattack and reinforce. A ceasefire was signed on August 31, 1996, which forced the Russians to withdraw from the country, leaving Chechnya as a technically independent state.
Comparisons to Ukraine
While the strategic situation in 1994 Chechnya was different compared to our time, there are still several similarities. Optimistic Russian outlooks were quickly disproved in both Chechnya and Ukraine, and complacency was responsible for unnecessary losses in both conflicts.
Poor tactics also appeared in both wars. In Chechnya, Russian forces misused their numerical advantage by ignoring important principles of urban warfare. Cases of bad doctrine have been common in Ukraine as well. At the tactical level, the Russian Army has shown poor coordination and usage of units, such as with tanks, while at the strategic level, the Ukrainian invasion was overall poorly planned, with few contingencies in case of protracted resistance.
The lack of preparation undermined Russia’s efforts in both Chechnya and Ukraine as well. While stockpile shortages have been more of an issue in Ukraine than in Chechnya, an insufficient logistics system has been present in both conflicts. In the First Chechen War especially, the Russian logistics system could not supply enough food, water, ammunition, and equipment, which obviously degraded combat effectiveness. The failure of the logistics system in Ukraine has been shown most famously with the 40-mile-long column that was stalled outside of Kyiv.
If you ever need to lead a military campaign in the future, the acronym PLAN will help you:
P – Plan and prepare for combat
L – Logistics
A – determine the enemy composition And the force required to achieve your objectives
N – Never let the meddling politicians get in the way of sound military planning or at least make sure someone else takes the blame if your campaign fails
The Russians did not abide by this acronym, and we can see how that ended.
The Second Chechen War
While Chechnya was technically an independent state after the first war, it still maintained governmental connections to Russia. Violent crime was highly rampant, and much of this crime spread to neighboring Russia. Islamist and separatist groups in Chechnya committed several major terrorist attacks throughout Russia, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians between 1996-1999. In 1999, the Chechen Republic became an Islamic state, although it was weakened by rival warlords. Soon after, in August 1999, a couple thousand Chechen militants invaded the neighboring province of Dagestan in Russia. This invited the Russians to mount another military campaign into Chechnya.
A notable difference in the second war is that Vladimir Putin was serving as prime minister by the time the war broke out. He would later replace Yeltsin as president of Russia on New Year’s Eve of 1999.
At the start of the war, the Russians swept through Dagestan and liberated it with relatively little difficulty by mid-September. This was conducted in tandem with a large aerial bombing campaign over Chechnya, hoping to destroy as many insurgents as possible.
This approach was much more methodical than in the first war. Previously, the Russian armed forces conducted their attack as quickly as possible with whatever forces were available. In the second war, the Russians took more time to assemble forces, plan, and soften up Chechnya before beginning their offensive.
On the 1st of October, 1999, Putin ordered the land invasion of Chechnya to begin. Once again, the Russian forces moved with ease in the flat north of the country. The operation to encircle Grozny began on October 12th. All throughout the campaign, Russian forces made liberal use of artillery and airpower to soften up targets, a safe and effective strategy for reducing military deaths by converting them into civilian ones.
One major, although misguided, lesson that the Russians learned from the first war was that urban warfare should always be avoided. This was reflected in their continued lack of urban combat training, and in their battle plans. While this approach would prevent the army from blundering into unnecessary, painful battles, it also meant they were unprepared when they had no choice but to engage in urban warfare.
After the Russians encircled Grozny in mid-October, they stopped and waited. While officials repeatedly stated they did not intend to storm the city, it is likely they had plans to eventually assault it. Russian forces constantly bombarded the city using artillery and airpower, hoping to destroy as many Chechen forces as possible. However, the encirclement, similar to the last war, was not perfect, allowing the Chechens to reinforce and supply the city.
The second assault on Grozny was far less of a debacle, but it still resulted in many Russian casualties. Even though Russian forces had to re-learn urban combat techniques, their coordination and formations were far better. Vehicles were properly supported by dismounted infantry, tanks used their explosive reactive armor, and the soldiers made continued use of heavy firepower. The battle lasted from mid-December to early February of 2000, with a considerable 368 killed and 3469 wounded on the Russian side.
The Second Chechen War ended in May of 2000, resulting in Russian federal rule being restored in Chechnya. While insurgencies in the region continue to this day, Chechnya has remained a Russian state.
Comparisons to Ukraine
Despite the fact that Russia fought a war in the exact same location only 3 years earlier, the Second Chechen War was still a difficult endeavor. However, the improvements in tactics and strategy showed that the Russians could learn. The Chechen Wars are yet another example of Russia’s tendency to learn from its mistakes, after incurring disproportionately high casualties.
While the war in Ukraine has gone poorly so far, this does not mean the Russians are not capable of adapting. For example, Ukraine had a fleet of Turkish-built Bayraktar drones, which were used to destroy several Russian vehicles in the earlier months of the war. We have not heard anything about these drones in recent months, suggesting they have all been destroyed, or are no longer effective in combat. Either way, there is still evidence that the Russian Army can make reforms to its operations.
Can Ukraine Win?
Maybe; in all three wars, Russia had the numbers and equipment to mount an effective combined-arms operation, but misused these resources. The Russians are likely improving, although we have not seen enough changes to give them a strategic advantage yet.
The large scale of the Ukraine war has required Russia to use far more troops than they did in Chechnya. While Russia may have made similar mistakes at the start of the invasion as they did in the past, the larger scale made their mistakes more costly. Stockpiles of important materiel and munitions appear to be running low due to the length of the conflict and heavy losses. It is possible, but not guaranteed, that Russia has lost too much to recover from.
Another difference from the Chechen wars is that Ukraine is receiving considerable foreign aid from the western world. Aside from first-rate equipment, important supplies such as ammunition and replacement parts have been sent to improve Ukraine’s ability to support a protracted war, making its strategic situation much more favorable.
While the future is still highly uncertain, we now have better insight into what can happen, based on what we know is similar and different from the past. While we hope that Ukraine wins, we must remember that their victory is not guaranteed.
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